Many theories, based on neuroscientific and psychological empirical evidence and on computational concepts, have been elaborated to explain the emergence of consciousness in the central nervous system. These theories propose key fundamental mechanisms to explain consciousness, but they only partially connect such mechanisms to the possible functional and adaptive role of consciousness. Recently, some cognitive and neuroscientific models try to solve this gap by linking consciousness to various aspects of goal-directed behaviour, the pivotal cognitive process that allows mammals to flexibly act in challenging environments. Here we propose the Representation Internal-Manipulation (RIM) theory of consciousness, a theory that links the main elements of consciousness theories to components and functions of goal-directed behaviour, ascribing a central role for consciousness to the goal-directed manipulation of internal representations. This manipulation relies on four specific computational operations to perform the flexible internal adaptation of all key elements of goal-directed computation, from the representations of objects to those of goals, actions, and plans. Finally, we propose the concept of `manipulation agency' relating the sense of agency to the internal manipulation of representations. This allows us to propose that the subjective experience of consciousness is associated to the human capacity to generate and control a simulated internal reality that is vividly perceived and felt through the same perceptual and emotional mechanisms used to tackle the external world.

In mammals, goal-directed and planning processes support flexible behaviour usable to face new situations or changed conditions that cannot be tackled through more efficient but rigid habitual behaviours. Within the Bayesian modelling approach of brain and behaviour, probabilistic models have been proposed to perform planning as a probabilistic inference. Recently, some models have started to face the important challenge met by this approach: grounding such processes on the computations implemented by brain spiking networks. Here we propose a model of goal-directed behaviour that has a probabilistic interpretation and is centred on a recurrent spiking neural network representing the world model. The model, building on previous proposals on spiking neurons and plasticity rules having a probabilistic interpretation, presents these novelties at the system level: (a) the world model is learnt in parallel with its use for planning, and an arbitration mechanism decides when to exploit the world-model knowledge with planning, or to explore, on the basis of an entropy-based confidence on the world model knowledge; (b) the world model is a hidden Markov model (HMM) able to simulate sequences of states and actions, thus planning selects actions through the same neural generative process used to predict states; (c) the world model learns the hidden causes of observations, and their temporal dependencies, through a biologically plausible unsupervised learning mechanism.